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FINDING LIKELIHOOD OF 
CONFUSION WITH ACTUAL 
CONFUSION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS' APPROACH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Likelihood of confusion is the cornerstone of trademark 
infringement. 1 If this likelihood exists, then confusion as to the 
source of a good or service probably exists among a substan-
tial number of reasonable buyers.2 One of the primary pur-
poses of trademark law is to prevent this likelihood from 
occurring. 3 
1. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:3, 23:1 (2d ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter 2 J. MCCARTHY]; See Faruld, Litigation Involving Trademarks: Preparing 
the Trademark Case for Trial, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 85, 88 (1990) [hereinafter Faruld, 
Litigation Involving Trademarks]; See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 717, 728 (1938); 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment b (Tent. Draft No.2, 
1991). 
2. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, §§ 23:1 at 35-36,23:27, at 87-88. This noted com-
mentator observed that determining trademark infringement depends entirely on a 
likelihood of confusion in the mind of an appreciable number of "reasonably prudent 
buyers." See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 728 comment a (1938); RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment h (Tent. Draft No.2, 1991). This comment con-
tains the Draft author's definition of the reasonably prudent purchaser: the ordinary 
purchaser of the goods or services buying with ordinary care. 
3. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod. Inc., 930 F.2d 277,291, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1417, 1429 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,112 S. Ct. 373 (1991). "Trademark 
infringement is established if the plaintiff proves that (1) the marks are valid and legal-
ly protectable; (2) the marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant's use 
of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the 
origin of the goods or services."; See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F. 
Supp. 1307, 1313 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (1986); See Lanham Act § 2, 15 
U.S.C. §l052(d) (1988): 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be dis-
tinguished from the goods of others shall be refused regis-
tration on the principal register on account of its nature 
unless it ... 
(d) consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark 
registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade name pre-
viously used in the United States by another and not aban-
doned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the 
applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive ... ; 
393 
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Federal courts rely predominantly on the Restatement of 
Torts approach when analyzing likelihood of confusion." The 
Restatement analysis examines an infringement claim by 
applying a scheme of four factors. Thus, courts decide if con-
fusion is likely by critiquing: (1) the degree of similarity 
between the competing marks in appearance, pronunciation of 
any words used, verbal translation of the pictures or designs 
involved, and suggestion; (2) the actor's (i.e. alleged infringer's) 
intent in adopting the similar mark; (3) the relation in use and 
manner between the goods and services marketed by the actor 
and those marketed by the other mark owner; and (4) the 
degree of care used by purchasers in relying on or choosing 
between similar marks.6 
Federal judges use these factors in various ways. They 
have modified the Restatement approach by adding factors to 
its scheme.6 Courts consistently include actual confusion on 
Lanham Act § 32,15 U.S.C. § 1114(I)(c) (1988): Any person who shall, without the con-
sent of the registrant 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with 
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of ny 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the 
remedies hereinafter provided.; 
Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser-
vices, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or 
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description 
offact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which 
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon-
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person ... 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes 
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.; 
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1274-78 (1946); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, 
§ 2:1, at 43. "The interest of the public in not being deceived has been called the basic 
policy." (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 137 U.S.P.Q. 
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963». 
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938). 
5.Id. 
6. Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th 
Cir. 1975). This court listed seven factors: the type of mark at issue, similarity of design, 
similarity of product, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of advertising 
media utilized, defendant's intent, and actual confusion.; In Re E.!. Dupont de 
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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these lists as the only factor which is objective, and not inher-
ently subjective.7 In addition, jurists caution that the correct 
approach to using the schemes is to weigh all factors equally, 
to not give greater merit to any factor over another, and to not 
expect the factors to reveal likelihood of confusion with· math-
ematical precision.8 Other than these caveats, however, courts 
give few clues as to how they use the factors to guide their rea-
soning as to whether confusion is likely or unlikely.9 
This case collected a comprehensive scheme of thirteen factors: similarity of marks, 
similarity of goods, trade channels, buyers and conditions of sale, fame of prior mark, 
third party uses, actual confusion vel non, length of concurrent use without confusion, 
variety of goods on which mark is used, market interface between parties, exclusiv-
ity of right of applicant, extent of potential confusion, and other probative facts.; 
Polaroid v. Polarad, 287 F.2d 492, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 268 U.S. 820 (1961). This seminal decision used a list of eight factors: the 
strength of the senior user's mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, 
the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, 
actual confusion, the defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of 
defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.; See Kirkpatrick, Likelihood 
of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 AM. U.L. REV 1221, 
1222 n.3 (1991) ("[G]enerally the courts consider, at a minimum: (I) the strength of 
the plaintiffs mark; (2) the similarity of the parties' respective marks; (3) the simi-
larities of the products or services; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) degree of pur-
chaser care; and (6) the defendant's intent .• ). 
7. See supra note 6. The subjective character of the other "likelihood factors· 
results from the lack of a method or standard that measures whether they are satis-
fied. For instance, no recognized means exists to test whether two marks are similar 
in sound or appearance, whether a senior user is likely to bridge the gap in markets 
used to sell two products, how similar products are, the quality of products, or the 
sophistication of buyers. 
Some factors seem to be better suited for assessing facets of trademark infringe-
ment other than likelihood of confusion. For example, the strength of a mark raises the 
issue of the degree of protection that a user will receive, not the issue of whether pro-
tection needs to be given. See Berkshire Fashions, Inc. V. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 
790, 795, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amend. denied, 729 F. Supp. 
221, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990); See also 
McGregor-Doniger Inc. V. Drizzle Inc., 599 F. 2d 1126, 1131-32,202 U.S.P.Q. 81, 88-
89 (2d Cir. 1979), affg., 446 F. Supp. 160, 161, 199 U.S.P.Q. 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
A junior user's intent or good faith in adopting a mark is the only other factor sug-
gested by case law as capable standing alone of being dispositive of the confusion issue. 
See Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1111, 
18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1596 (6th Cir. 1991). Other decisions have held that at best it rais-
es a presumption of confusion. See Squirtco V. The Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091, 
207 U.S.P.Q. 897,900 (8th Cir. 1980), affg in part and vacating in part, Squirt CO. V. 
The Seven-Up Co., 480 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Dreyfus Fund V. Royal Bank of 
Canada, 525 F. Supp. il08, 1121,213 U.S.P.Q. 872, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
8. Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 
(6th Cir. 1991); Ambrit, Inc. V. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 
1166·67 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); In re Application ofE. I. 
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 
1973); See also 3A R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK, & MONOPOLIES § 
20.07, at 32 (4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter 3A R. CALLMAN]. 
9. One leading commentator noted that the nature of any likelihood of confusion 
decision "lends itself to the judicial 'hunch' and that legal reasoning is after the fact 
of the decision.- 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:26, at 84·85. 
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This comment asserts that federal courts do not decide 
the likelihood of confusion issue by using these theories. 
Instead, the typical likelihood of confusion dispute is decided 
by giving actual confusion more weight than other analytical 
elements, despite courts' claims that they give the elements 
equal weight and consideration. 10 
It is time for courts to recognize explicitly this shift in the 
law. This article presents four justifications for doing SO.l1 
First, the strongest arguments against giving more weight to 
actual confusion are meritless. 12 Second, the rule is settled 
that actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood of con-
fusion. 13 Third, courts rely on actual confusion already and are 
10. The argument that actual confusion is emphasized is distinguishable from 
a previous commentator's suggestion that actual confusion should replace likelihood 
of confusion as the standard by which an interest in marks is measured. Cf. Note, 
Confusing Similarities in Trademarks: A Suggested Approach, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 470 
(1970). The most recent revision of federal trademark law ignored this latter suggestion. 
See Comment, What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 19887,16 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 129 (1990) (authored by Todd B. Carver). 
11. Trademark law is characterized in part by slow yet constant alteration. See 
generally McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 
During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93 (1981) [hereinafter McCarthy, 
Important Trends]. 
A reform of the process by which likelihood of confusion is found will be consis-
tent with other modem changes in trademark law. Common law trademarks protected 
the public's interest in being free from deception. Later developments brought the mark 
holder's property interests in a trademark within the ambit of trademark protection. 
More recently, the policy of encouraging competition has been used to support wider 
trademark protection. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp 670, 694-
95, 137 U.S.P.Q. 413, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 
2:1,2:4-2:14; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 comment b (Tent. 
Draft No.2 1991). 
The kind of confusion looked for in infringement actions has evolved from con-
fusion of source to confusion of sponsorship and quality assurance. See Triangle 
Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948); See infra pp. 10-13 & notes 
26-37; 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, §l:03. 
In addition, the person experiencing confusion has also changed. Originally, only 
the consumer's confusion could be considered; but now confusion among third parties 
who may see the senior mark holder's goods in use after the sale and outside the mar-
ketplace and persons familiar with the industry in which the trademarked item or ser-
vice is sold also can be taken into account. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss 
& Co., 631 F. Supp. 735, 746; 228 U.S.P.Q. 648, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 867, 
871,230 U.S.P.Q. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1986); See World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick'LittreU's New 
World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 487-88, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609,614 (5th Cir. 1971). 
One long standing dispute that is now settled concerned the question of whether 
the determination of likelihood of confusion was one oflaw or one of fact and what the 
standard of appellate review should be. The federal circuits currently lean heavily 
toward treating likelihood of confusion as Ii question offaet subject to a clearly erro-
neous standard of review. See generally Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues: 
The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (1991). 
12. See infra text pp. 8-10 & accompanying notes 18-25. . 
13. See infra text pp. 10-23 & accompanying notes 26-75. 
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satisfied that it exists even if only a low quantity of actual con-
fusion is proven.14 Lastly, trademark law is becoming an inde-
pendent field of law and the judicial glosses on key trademark 
statutes have increased the importance of actual confusion in 
infringement decisions.16 
The benefits of relying on actual confusion justify courts 
being explicit about using it as the paramount element of 
their analysis. Legal reasoning will be grounded thereby in an 
objective basis for finding likelihood of confusion. Also, a 
court's inquiry will be narrowed to marketplace confusion, 
the harm that trademark law seeks to prevent.18 Additionally, 
trademark applicants, users, and litigators will have notice of 
what to avoid in preparing a mark for use, and what to empha-
size in preparing for trial. 17 
II. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST EMPHASIZING ACTUAL 
CONFUSION 
Traditionally, two arguments prevented actual confusion 
from carrying more weight in proving the existence of a like-
lihood of confusion. First, most authorities agreed that actu-
al consumer confusion is hard to find. IS Second, a general 
consensus held that emphasizing actual confusion requires 
senior users to suffer irreparable harm while trying to uncov-
er evidence of actual confusion before bringing legal action 
against a party using a similar mark. 19 
The first objection is without foundation because even if evi-
dence of actual confusion could not be obtained in the past, it 
appears in modern case law in a number of forxp.s. A number 
14. See infra text pp. 23·30 & accompanying notes 74·96. 
15. See infra text pp. 30·31 & accompanying notes 94·102. 
16. See supra note 3. 
17. Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra note 1. 
18. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, 360 F.2d 609, 612, 146 U.S.P.Q. 666, 668 
(7th Cir. 1966). "[S]ince reliable evidence of actual confusion is difficult to obtain in 
trademark ... cases, any such evidence is substantial evidence oClikelihood of confusion."; 
See Harold F. Ritchie, Inc., v. Chesebrough·Pond's Inc., 281 F.2d 766,761 (2d Cir. 1968) 
("[R]eliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is practically almost impossible 
to secure." (citation omitted», rev'll, 176 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); See Chester 
Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd, 180 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (-[O]rdinarily 
evidence of actual confusion is difficult to secure ... "); See 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 8, 
§ 20.06; E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAw AND PROCEDURE § 6.62 (2d ed. 1979); 2 J. 
MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:2. See also Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, 
supra n. I, at 114. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 com· 
ment g (Tent. Draft No.2, 1991). 
19. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 23:2; See 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 8, § 20.06. 
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of cases report offers of proof of actual confusion with anecdotal 
evidence,20 surveys of reasonably prudent buyers in the mar-
ketplace,21 and a combination of anecdotes and surveys.22 
The second objection is weakened by two considerations. 
First, equitable relief protects mark holders from having to suf-
fer such harm. 23 Second, irreparable harm is at issue only if 
actual confusion is required.24 Where actual confusion is empha-
sized but not required in finding likelihood of confusion, a 
court's critique of the other likelihood of confusion elements still 
can provide a basis for equitable relief if actual confusion is 
absent. 25 
Thus it appears that the rationales for refusing to give 
actual confusion more weight are either untenable or avoidable. 
The result is that the argument against emphasizing actual 
confusion is weakened and the case that it is the primary tool 
for showing likelihood of confusion is strengthened. 
III. THE BEST EVIDENCE OF LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
Defeating the strongest objections to giving actual confu-
sion more weight helps establish that such confusion is used 
modernly as the dispositive factor in infringement analysis. 
Further support comes from the settled rule that actual 
20. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d ll61 (llth Cir. 
1986) (consumers confused), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Armco 
Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d ll55, ll60, 217 U.S.P.Q. 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(consumer confusion); Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46, 186 
U.S.P;Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) (consumers confused); World Carpets Inc. v. Dick 
Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 484, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609, 6ll (5th Cir. 1971) 
(retailers confused); Spangler Candy Company v. Crystal Pure Candy Company, 353 
F.2d 641, 643-44, 147 U.S.P.Q. 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1966) (consumer confused); Dr. Ing. 
h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp 1247, 1249,208 U.S.P.Q. 440, 442 (N.D. Tex. 
1979) (consumers, suppliers confused); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd., 
189 F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (customers and an advertiser confused). 
21. See generally Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Consumer Survey in 
Litigation Under Trademark Opposition, Trademark Infringement, and False 
Designation of Origin Provisions of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1063, 1114, and 
1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (1990) [hereinafter Annotation, Admissibility J. 
22. See Jockey International, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 
(S.D. Cal. 1975). 
23. PPX Enterprises v. Audio Fidelity Enterprises, 818 F.2d 266, 271, 2 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1672, 1675 (2d Cir. 1987); Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 
F. Supp. ll08, llll, 213 U.S.P.Q. 872, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); See also Resource 
Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 
139,17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1845 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
24. PPX Enterprises, 818 F.2d at 271, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1675-76. 
25. See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria SerraHes, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 
475,17 U.S.P.Q.2d ll04, 1110 (3d. Cir. 1990). 
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confusion is the best eyidence of likelihood of confusion. This 
rule can be traced to Judge Jerome Frank's dissent in Triangle 
Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich.26 
In Triangle Publications a magazine publisher began des-
ignating its publication with the title of "Seventeen." In 
January 1945 it registered this mark with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, thereby protecting its property rights in the 
mark to the greatest extent possible.27 Rohrlich, a manufacturer 
of women's undergarments, began using "Miss Seventeen" to 
designate its product in June 1945.28 Triangle Publications 
sued on the theory that concurrent use of the marks would like-
ly cause consumer confusion and that Rohrlich should be liable 
for such confusion. 
The majority held that Rohrlich's use of its mark would cre-
ate a risk that Triangle Publication's customers might think 
that Triangle made or sponsored Rohrlich's product. 29 In effect 
the public associated the common symbol "Seventeen" so close-
ly with Triangle's product that any other use of it would be cred-
ited to Triangle Publications.30 In fact, the same situation 
would have arisen if Triangle Publications published "Youth" 
magazine and Rohrlich manufactured and sold "Youth 
Girdles".31 If use of the infringing product disappointed a 
Triangle Publication customer, and she associated the product 
with Triangle Publications because of its similar trademark, her 
association implicates trademark law concerns regarding 
marketplace confusion.32 
Judge Frank's dissent attacked this characterization of 
the mark. He asserted that Triangle Publications had not 
made "Seventeen" descriptive of its interests alone, thus no 
probability of confusion between Rohrlich's product and 
26. 167 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1948). 
27. Id. at 970; See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988); See generally McCarthy, Important 
Trends, supra note 11, at 101-06 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 
F.2d 366, 188 U.S.P.Q. 623 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976». 
28. 167 F.2d at 970. 
29. Id. at 972-73. 
30. A common term has "secondary meaning" when it is identified by consumers 
with a producer, its goods, or its services. This concept is crucial to providing protec-
tion to marks which merely describe the qualities or characteristics of a product or ser-
vice, or one that is unregistered. If this link is not made by consumers, the mark is not 
protectable. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp 1307, 1314 (M.D. 
La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986); See also 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) (1988). 
31. Triangle Publications, 167 F.2d at 975. 
32.Id. 
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Triangle's magazine could exist.33 He then stated: "Of course, 
that conclusion would have to yield, were there here a finding, 
supported by evidence, of actual confusion or clear evidence that 
it is likely. "34 This statement signals the beginning of the shift 
in the law toward accepting actual confusion as the best evi-
dence of likelihood of confusion. 
Judge Frank believed that absent a finding that actual 
confusion exists, judges could only guess at what is "likely."36 
This is especially true where the judge is not a member of the 
buying public to whom the competing mark is sold. Frank 
noted that in the Triangle Publications litigation, "neither 
the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or resembles) 
a teen-age girl or the mother or the sister of such a girl."36 He 
believed that absent guidance as to how young women react 
when confronted with the competing marks, the courts are not 
fully informed on whether a reasonable person would be con-
fused as to the source or sponsorship of Rohrlich's girdles ifit 
used the applied-for trademark.s7 
Judge Frank's dissent started a trend, but did not cause 
. sudden adoption of actual confusion as the best evidence of a 
likelihood of confusion. Standard Oil Company v. Standard Oil 
Company illustrates how Frank's view gained acceptance only 
within the context of the Restatement of Tort's emphasis on the 
subjective elements that go toward showing confusion is 
probable. S8 
The Standard case arose from the 1911 court ordered dis-
solution of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Many 
entities owned and used the name "Standard Oil" in various 
combinations, with exclusive rights to the phrase within geo-
graphically defined areas.S9 
33. rd. at 975. Frank also attacked the majority's approach that the Triangle 
Publication mark had acquired secondary meaning. He noted that the characteriza-
tion was sound only if the mark indeed was "descriptive- and not "fanciful· or "sym-
bolic·. Frank interpreted the plaintiffs testimony that they titled their magazine 
"Seventeen" because it had acquired a popular descriptive meaning for an age group 
and its outlook on life as proof that no secondary meaning could attach to the word 
"Seventeen.· rd. He also held that even if secondary meaning existed the goods were 
so dissimilar that no probability of confusion could arise. rd. 
34. Id. at 976. 
35.Id. 
36. Id. at 975. 
37. rd. at 976. 
38. 252 F.2d 65 (lOth Oir. 1958), affg, 141 F. Supp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1956). 
39. Id. at 68-69. 
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In Standard, an Indiana corporation which owned and 
used "Standard Oil" as a trademark in fifteen states sued an 
Ohio corporation which owned the exclqsive right to use 
"Standard" in Ohio.~ Standard of Indiana brought its action 
when Standard of Ohio began selling gasoline and oil products, 
marked "SOHIO," in one of Standard of Indiana's states of 
exclusive use. The trial court held that this infringed upon 
Standard of Indiana's interests and enjoined Standard of Ohio 
from using "SOHIO" in Standard of Indiana's territory.41 
The Standard court proclaimed that "[t]here can be no 
more positive proof of likelihood of confusion than evidence of 
actual confusion," and held that the record led to "a fair and rea-
sonable inference" that confusion existed.42 However, it rigidly 
followed the Restatement of Torts and grounded its decision in 
the subjective factors of (1) the degree of similarity in appear-
ance, sound and meaning between the marks; (2) the intent of 
the defendants in adopting and using the term "SOHIO;" and 
(3) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers. 43 
The Standard court ignored its own view that the best 
way to show confusion is likely is to show that confusion exists. 
Thus, it initiated what would become a pattern in infringement 
cases: courts acknowledge the probative weight of actual con-· 
fusion, but refuse to admit explicitly that this element alone 
could establish that likelihood of confusion exists. 
Plough, Inc. u. Kreis Laboratories perpetuated the Standard 
approach.'4 In·Plough, the Ninth Circuit noted that " ... one of 
the better ways to prove likelihood of confusion in the future 
is to prove it existed in the past. "46 The court also cited the 
Restatement of Torts test to determine whether a probability 
of confusion exists: appearance, pronunciation and verbal 
translation.48 
However, Plough used the Restatement factors in a slight-
ly new fashion. It included the usual element of actual 
40. 1d. at 69. 
41. 1d. 
42. 1d. at 74. 
43. 1d. at 72. 
44. 314 F.2d 635, 136 U.S.P.Q. 560 (9th Cir. 1963). 
45. 1d. at 639, 641, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 563, 564. Plough does contain the caveat that 
actual confusion is not a requirement for infringement nor the standard by which to 
measure infringement. Instead, the settled standard ofproofis a likelihood of confusion. 
46. 1d. at 638, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 562 (Citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938». 
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confusion, and then added a "wild card" factor that could 
include a second analysis of whether consumers experienced 
confusion.47 Thus the court asked Plough, Inc. to show proof of 
(1) confusion of even one person in the marketplace; (2) simi-
larity in packaging; (3) similarity in sound of the names of the 
products; (4) exact copying; or (5) any effect upon prospective 
customers (emphasis added).48 Plough, Inc. failed to carry this 
burden and therefore failed to show any similarity that "would 
cause confusion of any appreciable number of ordinarily pru-
dent purchasers as to the source of the goods."49 
By listing actual confusion as the first element in a scheme 
offive, and by using the general language of "any effect" in the 
fifth element, Plough implicitly emphasized actual confusion 
more than previous courts. The lone dissenting judge in Plough 
noted this shift, and the fact that it occurred within the con-
text of a concession to the Restatement approach.60 
In fact, Plough's analysis depended on the Restatement of 
Torts approach to the same extent as did the reasoning in 
Standard and Triangle Publications. Plough did not state 
clearly that if evidence of actual confusion had been present-
ed, it would have been given greater deference than other ele-
ments of likelihood of confusion. Moreover, Plough did not 
suggest that actual confusion standing alone could prove the 
existence of likelihood of confusion. 
The 1965 decision in Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, 
Inc. 61 again perpetuated the approach developed by Standard 
and Plough. In Tisch, the plaintiffs owned and operated three 
luxury hotels (all called "Americana") in Florida, New York, 
and Puerto Rico. The defendants also engaged in the tourist 
business with two motels in Chicago, the "Americana Motel" 
and the "Americana Inn. "62 Tisch Hotels registered their 
mark, filed suit against Americana for trademark infringe-
ment, presented proof of actual confusion, but lost at the 
trial level. 63 
47. 1d. at 640,136 U.S.P.Q. at 564. 
48.1d. 
49. 1d. at 641, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 564. 
50. 1d. at 648, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 567 (Pope, J., dissenting). 
51. 350 F.2d 609, 146 U.S.P.Q. 566 (7th Cir. 1965). 
52. 1d. at 610, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 567. 
53. 1d. at 610-11, 146 U.S.P.Q at 567-68. 
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The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that actual confusion 
is "substantial evidence of likelihood of confusion",M while 
warning against emphasizing actual confusion.66 Thus Tisch, 
like Standard and Plough, moved trademark law closer to 
accepting actual confusion as the most probative element in 
trademark analysis but expressed reservations about explic-
itly acknowledging that it filled this purpose. 
World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets 66 
brought trademark law closer to relying on proof of actual 
confusion ,to establish a likelihood of confusion. World Carpets 
gave further support to the proposition that "[t]here can be no 
more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion 
than proof of actual confusion. "67 World Carpets strengthened 
the doctrine by noting that "[ w ]hile very little proof of actual 
confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood of con-
fusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof would be 
necessary to refute such proof. "68 
Thus, when Dick Littrell's failed to produce evidence to 
refute World Carpet's proffered instances of actual confusion, 
the court held that "[t]he evidence pointed so strongly in favor 
of a finding of confusion that the minds of reasonable men could 
not have arrived at a contrary decision. "69 The Fifth Circuit 
therefore upheld the trial court's directed verdict in favor of 
World Carpets.60 
. In Roto-Rooter Corporation v. O'Neal81 the Fifth Circuit 
reaffirmed its holding in World Carpets that "[actual confusion] 
54. Id. at 611-12, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 568. The Tisch court noted this was so even 
though likelihood of confusion can be proven without a showing of actual confusion. 
See also Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 (2d Cir. 
1960) ("Actual confusion or deception of purchasers is not essential to a finding of trade-
mark infringement ... [b]ut where such proof is adduced, weight should be given it."), 
rev'g., 176 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y 1959). 
55. Tisch Hotels, 350 F.2d at 611 n.4, 146 U.S.P.Q. at 568 n.4. 
56. 438 F.2d 482, 168 U.S.P.Q. 609 (5th Cir. 1971). 
57. Id. at 489,168 U.S.P.Q. at 615. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg 
Nachfv. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707,715-16,180 U.S.P.Q. 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973) ("[T]here can be no more positive proof of likelihood of confusion than evi-
dence of actual confusion"), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331, 1340, 186 
U.S.P.Q. 436, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1975); United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior 
Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp. 61, 77,175 U.S.P.Q. 525, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
("[E]vidence of actual confusion is extremely significant to a determination of the like-
lihood of confusion."), affd, 513 F.2d 1226, 185 U.S.P.Q. 257 (9th Cir. 1975). 
58. World Carpets, 438 F.2d at 489, 168 U.S.P.Q. at 615. 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
61. 513 F.2d 44, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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is the best evidence of likelihood of confusion. "62 Roto-Rooter 
presented four instances of persons who intended to hire 
RotoRooter but hired O'Neal instead. Each of these people 
confused the defendant with Roto-Rooter because O'Neal used 
a tradename similar to Roto-Rooter's. In the court's opinion, 
this raised the type of consumer confusion that trademark 
law tries to prevent.63 
Two of the most recent expositions of the idea that actual 
confusion is the best indicator that a likelihood of confusion 
exists or will exist are Sateway Stores, Inc. v. Sateway 
Insurance Company64 and Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara 
Lee Corp.66 
Sateway strongly supported the idea that actual confusion 
is paramount when evaluating the likelihood of confusion. It 
stated that "a sufficient demonstration of actual confusion 
could sustain a finding of the likelihood of confusion even in the 
absence of other proof."66 Sateway's endorsement of actual con-
fusion is tempered, however, by the court's reliance on a nine 
element scheme to determine whether confusion was likely.67 
The Sateway court also held that none of the factors is dis-
positive, in contradiction to its assertion that actual confusion 
standing alone could prove the existence of a likelihood of con-
fusion. 66 The court in Sateway not only contradicts itself, but it 
analyzed six of the nine elements in its scheme before looking 
for evidence of actual confusion, thereby affirming its loyalty to 
the Restatement approach to likelihood of confusion.69 
62. Id. at 45·46, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 74. 
63. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 supra, note 3. 
64. 657 F. Supp. 1307 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986). 
65. 725 F. Supp. 790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amend. denied, 729 
F. Supp. 21, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990). 
66. Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1316. See also Falcon Rice Mill v. Community 
Rice Mill, 725 F.2d 336, 345, 222 U.S.P.Q. 197,203 (5th Cir. 1984); Frisch's Restaurants 
v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 n.5, 214 U.S.P.Q. 15,20 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Chevron Chemical Company v. Voluntary Purchasing 
Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 704, 212 U.S.P.Q. 904,913 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1126 (1982). 
67. Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1313. Safeway's list of confusion factors 
included (1) the type of trademark alleged to have been infringed; (2) the similarity of 
design between the two marks; (3) similarity of the products or services; (4) the iden· 
tity of the retail outlets and purchasers; (5) the identity of the advertising medium uti· 
lized; (6) the defendant's intent; (7) evidence of actual confusion; (8) degree of care 
exercised by purchasers; and (9) diversity of products or services offered by the parties. 
68.Id. 
69. Id. at 1316·18. 
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In Berkshire, the court again listed a number of elements 
that can be examined, listing actual confusion fifth. However, 
Berkshire also noted that actual confusion is difficult to uncov-
er, thus concluding that proof of actual confusion is not nec-
essary for a finding of potential confusion.70 The court then 
noted that instances of confusion among trades people in a pro-
fession "is highly probative" on the issue of whether a likelihood 
of confusion exists "since wholesalers and retail dealers may 
be deemed to be more sophisticated about the origins and 
sources of product lines than average consumers." (Citations 
omitted).71 
Neither the Berkshire nor Safeway decisions openly gave 
actual confusion the weight that they claimed it deserved. 
Both courts examined each element (i.e. strength of senior 
user's mark, degree of similarity between the marks, the prox-
imity in the marketplace of the products, etc.) before examin-
ing the best evidence of likelihood of confusion actual confusion.72 
In Safeway, no actual confusion was found, thus a possi-
bility exists that the inquiry need have gone no further. In 
Berkshire, anecdotes of customers being confused by the sim-
ilar marks and an admissible, methodologically correct survey 
by the senior user (balanced against a less reliable survey by 
the defendant) showed a statistically significant amount of cus-
tomer confusion.73 Thus the Berkshire court could have begun 
its inquiry by looking first to the offer of proof on the existence 
of actual confusion. Mter ascertaining whether marketplace 
confusion existed, the case could have been decided in favor of 
the senior user. 
Yet the Berkshire court clung to past practices and made 
four subjective inquiries before it analyzed and weighed the evi-
dence of actual confusion.74 This approach is the legacy of 
courts assuming that actual confusion was hard to find and 
prove, and relying on the Restatement of Torts approach to 
trademark infringement.76 . 
70. Berkshire Fashions, 725 F. Supp. at 796,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129. 
71. Id. at 796-97,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129. 
72. Id. at 795, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128; See Safeway Stores, 657 F. Supp. at 1313. 
73. Berkshire Fashions, 725 F. Supp. at 797-98, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1130. 
74. Id. at 795-97,14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128-29. 
75. Id. at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1128. Berkshire looked back to an earlier 
infringement decision and used the earlier cases's elements which it developed direct-
ly from the Restatement. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U;S. 820 (1961). 
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The cases from Triangle Publications to Berkshire trace the 
development of tension between theory and practice in this area 
of trademark law. In theory, a multitude of elements, all of 
equal weight, are examined to find a likelihood of confusion. In 
practice, actual confusion is accepted as the best evidence of 
likelihood of confusion, but courts are reluctant to admit that 
they use it as a dispositive element. Instead, they maintain that 
"actual confusion is hard to find" and resort to the Restatement 
of Torts for guidance. 
IV. COURT'S RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL 
CONFUSION 
Thus far, two justifications have been advanced for express-
ly acknowledging that courts give more probative value to 
actual confusion than to other elements which show like-
lihood of confusion. First, the strongest objections to giving 
actual confusion a larger role are without foundation. Second, 
the idea that actual confusion is the best evidence of a likeli-
hood of confusion has been accepted in the case law. A third 
rationale lies in the fact that courts rely on actual confusion 
already. They allow a small quantity of proof of actual confu-
sion to satisfy the inquiry about its existence, and use anec-
dotes, surveys, and even the absence of actual confusion to 
assess the probability that a likelihood of confusion exists. 
A. ANECDOTAL CASES 
There is no bright line or absolute number of incidents of 
actual confusion that can establish actual confusion's exis-
tence.78 Instead, actual confusion is evaluated "[i]n the light of 
the circumstances involved. "77 Homeowners Group, Inc. v. 
Home Marketing Specialists, Inc. held that "[p]erhaps as 
important as the number of instances of confusion are the 
kinds of persons confused and degree of confusion. "78 
76. Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,1543,1 U.S.P.Q.2d ll61, ll71 (llth 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
77.1d. 
78. 931 F.2d 1100, lll0, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1595 (6th Cir. 1991). In Home-
owners, the evidence of actual confusion consisted of deposition testimony from 
Homeowners' national marketing director that he knew of instances of confusion by 
real estate customers and a letter from a real estate broker.; See Safeway Stores, Inc. 
v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d ll60, ll67, 216 U.S.P.Q. 599, 604 (llth Cir. 1982). 
·Perhaps as important as, and helping to explain the various interpretations of the 
relevance of. the number of instances of confusion are the kinds of persons confused 
and degree of confusion. Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals casually 
acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight, while confusion of actual cus-
tomers of a business is worthy of substantial weight.· (Citation omitted). 
14
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In Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., the court held that Ambrit 
established actual confusion by presenting only four instances 
of customer confusion.79 These customers complained to Ambrit 
that they mistakenly purchased a competitor's product because 
its similar label confused them.80 These otherwise isolated 
instances carried considerable weight because the customers 
purchased relatively inexpensive items from alarge corpora-
tion. According to the Ambrit court, most customers do not take 
the time to complain in similar situations, so any such com-
plaint is given great deference in spite of being an isolated inci-
dent among many similar purchases.81 
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., Inc. 82 also used 
anecdotes of actual confusion as an important tool in finding 
trademark infringement. In Armco, a steel manufacturer 
sought to enjoin the use of the "Armco" name in a burglar 
and fire alarm business.83 Mer trying to negotiate a settlement, 
the manufacturer filed suit seeking damages and injunctive 
relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.84 
The steel manufacturer presented evidence that its employ-
ees had received phone calls, over an extended period of time, 
from people trying to contact the alarm company/defendant. 
These consumers had become confused when relying on the sim-
ilarity between the two marks.85 Additionally, one of the steel 
manufacturer's employees testified that two friends had asked, 
based on their knowledge of the existence of defendant's mark, 
"When did y'all get into the burglar alarm business?"86 
79. 812 F.2d 1531, 1544, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1171-72 (11th Cir. 1986). 
80.Id. 
81. Id. See also Jellibean8, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 715 F.2d 833, 
844,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 10, 19-20 (11th Cir. 1983) (few incidents of actual confusion estab-
lish its existence); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1167, 
216 U.S.P.Q. 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1982) (one misdirected letter from a creditor and one 
misdirected customer inquiry established actual confusion); Compare Sun Banks of 
Florida v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan, 651 F.2d 311, 319, 211 U.S.P.Q. 844, 851 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (nineteen instances of confusion do not establish actual confusion) and 
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263, 205 U.S.P.Q. 969, 978-79 (5th 
Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 614 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 
(1980) (two verbal inquiries as to whether two mark holders were related to, each other 
and one misdirected letter do not establish actual confusion and are insufficient to sus-
tain a finding of likelihood of confusion). 
82. 693 F.2d 1155, 217 U.S.P.Q. 145 (5th Cir. 1982). 
83. Id. at 1156, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 146-47. 
84. Id. at 1158, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 147. 
85. Id. at 1160, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 149. 
86. Id. at 1160, nn.l0-12, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 149, nn.l0-12. 
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Again, the quantity of confusion is low. But in Armco, as in 
Homeowners and Ambrit, a few instances of actual confusion 
constituted sufficient proof of likelihood of confusion. Where 
this probability is established, trademark concerns are impli-
cated and a plaintiff is entitled to relief.87 
Two implications flow from great probative weight being 
given to a small quantity of evidence of actual confusion. First, 
actual confusion should be given greater weight than other fac-
tors balanced by most courts when ascertaining likelihood of 
confusion. Second, courts can justify their emphasis on actu-
al confusion without disturbing traditional trademark pro-
tections. 
B. SURVEY CASES 
The use of surveys in infringement actions also shows that a 
statistically low level of actual confusion is sufficient to establish 
actual confusion. 88 Judicial acceptance and trust of surveys grew 
as poll takers refined and improved the discipline of conducting 
public opinion surveys.89 Surveys are an integral part of modern 
trademark infringement litigation, and failure to conduct one can 
lead to an inference that likelihood of confusion does not exist.90 
Surveys are now easily admitted into evidence in trademark 
litigation so long as a proper foundation is established.91 
87. Id. at 1161, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 150. See Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 
44,46, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975) (four incidents of confusion are sufficient 
to satisfy existence of actual confusion); Spangler Candy Company v. Crystal Pure 
Candy Company, 353 F.2d 641, 647,147 U.S.P.Q. 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1965) (five inde-
pendent incidents of confusion establish actual confusion; incidents impeached by show-
ing bias thus diminishing their wieght); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Laurie, Ltd., 
189 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (two incidents of customers approaching plaintiffs 
salesmen with questions regarding defendant's product combined with an inquiry from 
an advertiser who also confused the two labels proved actual confusion existed). 
88. See generally Evans and Gunn, Trademark Survey Evidence, 20 TEx. TECH 
L. REV. 1,3 (1989) [hereinafter Evans & Gunnl; Annotation, Admissibility, supra note 
21; Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra note I, at 114-17. 
89. Evans and Gunn, supra note 88, at 9-10. See also Standard Oil Co. v. 
Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65 (lOth Cir. 1958); United States v. Eighty-eight Cases, 
More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. 
denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 
137 U.S.P.Q. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
90. E. S. Originals Inc. v. Stride Rite Corporation, 656 F. Supp. 484, 490, 2 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1934, 1939 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
91. See Amstar Corporation v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263, 205 
U.S.P.Q. 969, 979 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 617 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). (defendant's survey rejected as contrived and plaintiffs 
for being conducted improperly); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Camasie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 
F. Supp. 1189, 1201-05,217 U.S.P.Q. 1137, 1144, 1147-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (survey 
rejected); See generally Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks, supra n. I, at 
16
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Some courts have held that survey results showing a very 
low percentage of actual confusion among respondents to the 
survey is proof of actual confusion.92 Such an approach can be 
attributed to the idea that actual confusion, no matter how 
slight, is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. . 
The low percentage of actual confusion that a survey needs 
to prove carries the same implications as the high probative 
value given to small quantities of anecdotal evidence of actu-
al confusion. Where it is found, actual confusion is highly pro-
bative of likelihood of confusion and almost impossible to 
refute. Thus, actual confusion deserves to be given greater 
weight than othet: factors used by courts faced with the issue 
of likelihood of confusion. 
c. LACK OF ACTUAL CONFUSION CASES 
While proof of actual confusion in the past and/or in the pre-
sent is the best method of proving likelihood of confusion in the 
future, some courts make an additional assertion: a lack of actu-
al confusion is proof that no likelihood of confusion exists.93 This 
rule is applied under either of two conditions: (1) the party or 
parties are giant corporations with the ability to conduct sur-
veys or have record keeping systems that will retain anecdo-
tal evidence of actual confusion94 or (2) the two marks have been 
concurrently used for a significant period of time without 
actual confusion occurring.96 
115; Annotation, Admissibility, supra note 21, at 23. In general, a survey must be fair 
and scientifically conducted by qualified experts and impartial interviewers, responses 
should be drawn from a sample ofa relevant portion of potential consumers, survey ques-
tions should not mislead or show a bias for one product over another, and responses should 
be recorded in an unbiased manner. Note that a flawed survey may be inadmissible, but 
flaws often only affect the weight to be given the survey after admission. [d. 
92. See Exxon Corporation v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, 528 F.2d 500, 507, 
208 U.S.P.Q. 384,390 (5th Cir. 1980) (15% of people surveyed associated infringing mark 
"TEXON" with senior user's "EXXON".); Evans and Gunn, Trademark Survey Euidence, 
supra note 88, at 22. The commentators in this article assert that there exists an "emerg-
ing national consensus that a showing often percent or more is sufficient to establish 
likelihood of confusion. -; Cf. Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp 
790, 797, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), amen.d. den.ied, 729 F. Supp. 
790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (28% of sur-
vey respondents associated infringing mark "ENERGIZER" on gloves with the plain-
tiffs registered mark "SHEER ENERGY" on pantyhose.). 
93. Falcon Rice Mill v. Community Rice Mill, 725 F.2d 336, 347-48, 222 U.S.P.Q. 
197,205 (5th Cir. 1984); See McGregorDoniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126,1136, 
202 U.S.P.Q. 81, 91 (2nd Cir. 1979), affg, 446 F. Supp. 160,199 U.S.P.Q. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978); See also American Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
94. American Optical Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 410. 
95. McGregor-Doniger Inc., 599 F.2d at 1136 n.6, 202 U.S.P.Q. at 91 n.6. 
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These decisions reemphasize the growing role that courts 
have been giving to actual confusion. However, they still do not 
admit expressly that this is the approach taken. 
Iv. ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW 
The final rationale that justifies the assertion that courts 
emphasize actual confusion when analyzing a likelihood of 
confusion issue grows from two developments in the trademark 
field. First, judicial interpretation of language in trademark 
statutes places greater importance on actual confusion. Second, 
trademark law became an independent field of law, suggesting 
that it is moving away from tort doctrines. 
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TRADEMARK STATUTES 
According to Resource Developers, Inc. v. The Statue of 
Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, Inc.,s6 a plaintiff seeking 
damages under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,s7 must prove 
that actual confusion exists.98 By putting this gloss on the 
statutory language, Resource Developers gave more support to 
the use of this element as the key element in infringement dis-
putes. The court not only emphasized actual confusion, it 
made it a prerequisite to recovery. 
B. TRADEMARK LAW AND TORT DOCTRINES 
The American Law Institute drafted the Restatement 
Second of Torts without the sections defining confusing simi-
larity found in the First Restatement. 99 The Restatement 
authors noted that confusion of source had developed into a sub-
stantial specialty "governed extensively by legislation and 
largely divorced from [its] initial grounding in the principles 
oftorts."IOO The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition 
now contains the equivalent sections. 101 
96. 926 F.2d 134, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988). 
98. Resource Developers, 926 F.2d at 139, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1845; See PPX 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 271-72, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1672, 1675 (2d Cir. 1987); Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79, 
211 U.S.P.Q. 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983). 
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, DIV. IX, Introduction (1978). 
100. Id. 
101. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9-37 (Tent. Draft No.2, 
1991 & Tent. Draft No.3, 1991). 
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The signal sent by the Restatement authors is that tort 
principles should have a diminished impact on trademark law.102 
Thus courts should not be obligated to weigh actual confusion 
equally with the other elements oflikelihood of confusion mere-
ly because the Restatement advanced this view in the past. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Acknowledging that actual confusion is the most important 
of the likelihood of confusion elements is an exercise in mak-
ing explicit that which is implicit through practice; it is not a 
call for the restructuring of trademark law. The federal courts 
have recognized actual confusion's value as the best evidence 
of the harm that trademark law tries to prevent: the likelihood 
of confusion. 
The availability of anecdotal evidence and surveys of actu-
al confusion shows that proof of such confusion is not hard to find. 
Likewise, the use of equitable relief can alleviate the concern that 
emphasizing actual confusion will lead to irreparable harm. 
Actual confusion must be proven in order to receive dam-
ages under the federal trademark laws. Finally, the 
Restatement authors, who originated the likelihood of confu-
sion elements, have noted that trademark law has trans-
gressed its tort law roots. 
The court's analysis of infringement need take only one 
more step: to explicitly acknowledge that actual confusion is the 
dispositive element in deciding such controversies. This would 
provide guidance to current and future mark holders because 
they would know exactly what evidence is necessary to protect 
their marks. 
Likewise, judicial economy would be promoted if courts 
clearly relied on actual confusion. Mark users would be encour-
aged to use the federal registration process in order to estab-
lish a lack of confusion early in a mark's use. As more marks 
are registered, more notice is given to future mark holders as 
to what marks are taken. Thus, they can avoid using marks 
that clearly would cause confusion and lead to expensive and 
time consuming litigation. 
Edwin S. Clark* 
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Drv. IX, Introductory Note, 1 (1978). 
,.. Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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